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Abstract
This paper calculates the net benet of admitting immigrants under the dened-
return-ratio pay-as-you-go pension system, considering the assimilation costs the
next generation whose parents are from abroad must pay as additional costs.
As a result, no matter how many immigrants come, the host country can get
the positive net benets through the dened-return-ratio pension system. This
result is quietly di¤erent from those in Jinno (2011, 2013).
Keywords: Immigrants, the dened-return-ratio, the net benets.
1 Introduction
We develop an overlapping-generations model based on Razin and Sadka (1999)
to consider the e¤ects of the assimilation costs like Jinno (2011, 2013). The
assimilation costs are the costs the rst child generation of the immigrants must
pay to assimilate themselves into the host country, which in a sense, implies a
loss of the productivity per capita of the next generation. The di¤erent point
in this paper from Jinno (2011, 2013) is the nance method of pension where
the rate of return from pension contribution is already dened a certain level
and constant; we call this system as the RDC system in this paper (The [R]ate
of return from the pension contribution is [D]ened [C]onstant).
Basically the future generation su¤ers from the higher burden when the
fertility rate is low under the RDC system because the fewer future generation
must nance the constant rate of returns from pension contributions. Thus,
on the contrary, accepting immigrants under the RDC system generally could
decrease the burden of the working generation because it means an increase
in the number of working people who share the burden of pension nance and
thus, the pension contribution per capita would be lower than without any
immigrants. A decrease in the pension contribution would also means a decrease
in the future burden of the pension nance and the size of pension itself, which
also implies an improvement in the future welfare.
However, in this paper, the assimilation costs are also considered, thus, ac-
cepting immigrant under the RDC system does not directly imply an improve-
ment of the welfare of the future native generations because the assimilation
costs decreases the productivity of the next generation per capita. We would
like to check whether accepting immigrants could increase the welfare of the na-
tive residents or not considering the assimilation costs under the RDC system.
In Jinno (2013), a dened-benet pension system (DB system) and a de-
ned contribution pension system (DC system) are compared considering the
assimilation costs. One of some results is that the net benets for native res-
idents caused by permitting a small (large) number of immigrants under the
DB system becomes higher (lower) than that under the DC system in certain
practical situations. What is more, according to Jinno (2011, 2013), under both
of the DB system and the DC system the net benet for native residents from
accepting immigrants does not become positive. However, this paper shows that
even if the assimilation costs are considered, the net benets for native residents
under the RDC system always becomes positive without any conditions1 .
2 The Model
An overlapping-generation model based on Razin and Sadka (1999) is used con-
sidering the assimilation cost. Individuals live for two periods, namely the work-
ing period and the retired period. First of all in the working period, they decide
1There are so many papers considering the e¤ects of admitting immigrants; Lagos and La-
comba (2005) analyze when the optimal period of being retired should be, Kemnitz(2003, 2006,
2008) does how the e¤ects of admitting immigrants are when the unemployment is considered,
Casarico and Devillanova (2003) does how the optimal choices on education should be, and
the e¤ects of admitting immigrans in various sectors are considered Shimasawa and Oguro
(2011) and Saito, Kato, and Takeda(2017). These papers do not consider the assimilation
costs which have much inuences on the future generations.
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whether to be a skilled worker or an unskilled worker. Innate higher (lower)
ability individuals study less (more) time and thus only innate higher ability
individuals can be skilled workers whose productivity are higher than unskilled
workers. The rest of them with lower abilities become unskilled workers without
any loss of working time. Compare with their peers, immigrants o¤spring re-
quire more time to become skilled workers because of the language and culture
barriers they must overcome. We call this extra burden immigrants o¤springs
must pay to be skilled workers the assimilation costs. During the retired period,
they consume all the returns from their savings and pension benets.
In this paper, the e¤ects of accepting immigrants for the net benets for the
native residents are analyzed under the RDC pension system where the rate of
pension benets is constant. Thus, the pension contribution may be decided
endogenously to balance the pension budget. Here, immigration occurs only in
the rst period. The subscript n is used to denote native residents and m to
denote immigrants.
2.1 Immigration
In period zero, the country receives young unskilled immigrants without any
capital. Although they can not become skilled workers, their o¤spring can with
more extra burden than the native residents. We assume that the innate abilities
of the o¤spring are distributed similarly and that the fertility rate is identical
in both groups in line with the literature (Razin and Sadka 1999; Krieger 2003).
2.1.1 Individual ability and behavior
Individuals can become skilled workers by investing e units of time in school,
which ranges from 0 to 1, represents the innate ability to acquire skills. They
will work for the remaining time, denoted by 1   e when they become skilled
workers. This assumption implies that a lower e individual is more capable
and needs less time to acquire skills2 . For simplicity, the di¤erence in labor
output between skilled and unskilled workers is the productivity of labor supply:
while the productivity of skilled worker is one unit for each unit of working
time, an unskilled worker provides only q < 1 units of e¤ective labor for each
unit of working time. Individuals can be unskilled workers without any loss of
time, which implies the working time of unskilled workers becomes one while it
depends on the innate ability of individuals who become skilled workers.
When becoming skilled workers, the o¤spring of immigrants have to spend
additional time learning the language, culture, and so on. This additional time
is the cost of assimilation, '. This cost is the same value for all immigrant
o¤spring, but the continuity of the assimilation cost is assumed for only one
period, which implies that the second-and-further o¤spring of immigrants can
be skilled workers without any assimilation costs3 .
2The innate ability, e, ranges from 0 to 1. The cumulative distribution function of ability
e is the same between the native and the immigrant individuals and denoted by G (), where
G (ex), (x = n or m) refers to the number of individuals with an innate ability parameter that
is below or equal to ex. For simplicity, during the initial analysis of the economy, the number
of native individuals born in period zero is normalized to one, that is G(1) = 1.
3OECD (2016) "PISA 2015 Results" shows that the di¤erence in the performance is smaller
between second-generation immigrant students and non-immigrant students than that between
rst-generation immigrant students and non-immigrant students. Thus, we assume the burden
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In the rst period, each individual decides whether to acquire skills to be-
come a skilled worker, after which he or she then works; bears 1 + g o¤spring
(the same for all individuals); consumes a single all-purpose good; and saves
for his or her retirement. In the second period (i.e., during retirement), each
individual consumes his or her pension and all the returns from savings that
were accumulated in the previous period.
We would like to compare the results in this paper with those in Jinno (2011,
2013). Thus, we also assume a small country with free access to international
capital markets, which implies the rate of return from saving (r) and the wage
rate (w) are also xed independent of the level of migration.
The income of a native-born i-th smart individual who decides to acquire
skills through schooling is represented by
 
1  ein

w (1   (M)), where  (M)
represents the endogenous pension contribution (tax) rate which depends the
number of immigrants. Since the immigrant o¤spring requires additional time
to develop his or her skills (i.e., the assimilation cost), the income of those
who work as skilled workers is represented by
 
1  eim   '

w (1   (M)). The
income of unskilled workers for the natives and the immigrants is represent as
qw (1   (M)) :
Individuals choose to become skilled as long as the income of skilled workers
is higher than that of unskilled workers. Further, there exists a cuto¤ levels for
innate ability ex, where both incomes are equal, which are,
(1  en)w (1  t) = qw (1  t) (1)
(1  em   ')w (1  t) = qw (1  t) (2)
Individuals whose innate ability ex is lower than ex will decide to be skilled
workers, whereas those whose innate ability exceeds the cuto¤ levels will decide
to be unskilled workers. Based on equations (1) and (2), we have
en = 1  q (3)
em = 1  q   ' (4)
Since the productivities of unskilled native and immigrant workers are as-
sumed to be identical, based on equations (3) and (4), the relationship between
the cuto¤ levels for innate ability for native and immigrant workers is written
as em = e

n   ', which shows that the cuto¤ level for innate ability for immi-
grant workers, em that is, the level at which they decide whether to become a
skilled or an unskilled worker, is less than that for native individuals. Hence,
the number of skilled immigrant workers is found to be less than that of skilled
native workers. If '  1 q holds, all immigrant o¤spring will become unskilled
workers. Thus, we assume that ' < 1  q.
2.2 Maximization Problems
The preference to the consumption is the same between the natives and the im-
migrants. They get utility from the consumptions in the working period (c)and
of assimilating themselves into the host country lasts for a period.
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in the retired period (d). The utility function is assumed as Cobb-Douglas util-
ity function like u (c; d) =  log c +  log d, where  () is the preference to
the consumption in the working period (in the retired period). The sum of the
returns from savings and pension benets is consumed in the retirement period.
There is no bequest for simplication. Individuals face the intertemporal budget
constraint
c
 
eix

+
d
 
eix

1 + r
= (1   (M))W  eix+ b  eix1 + r  I  eix (5)
where W
 
eix

represents the pre-pension-contribution-paid incomes, b
 
eix

the
pension benets, and I
 
eix

the present valued and after-pension-cotribution-
paid total income. The pre-pension-contribution-paid incomes for the natives
become
W
 
ein

= f
 
1  ein

w ein < e

n
qw ein  en
. On the contrary the pre-pension-contribution-paid incomes for the immigrants
become
W
 
eim

= f
 
1  ein   '

w eim < e

m
qw eim  em
The pre-pension-contribution-paid incomes for the native and immigrant un-
skilled worker become equal.
Maximizing utility with respect to consumptions and savings subject to the
intertemporal budget constrain yields the optimal consumptions and savings:
s
 
eix

=

(+ )
(1  t)W
 
eix
  
(+ )
b
 
eix

(1 + r)
(6)
c
 
eix

=

(+ )
I
 
eix; t

(7)
d
 
eix

=

(+ )
(1 + r) I
 
eix; t

(8)
.
2.3 Labor Supply
In 0 period, there are one unit of the natives and M unit of the unskilled
immigrants. The labor supply of skilled native resident workers with the i-
th ability is denoted by
 
1  ein

, while that of unskilled native resident and
immigrant workers is denoted by q. The aggregate supply of e¤ective labor in
period zero is given by
L0 =
Z en
0
(1  e) dG+ q [1 G (en)] + qM: (9)
The rst term on the right-hand side of the equation refers to the e¤ective labor
supply of skilled native resident workers, while the second term refers to the
e¤ective labor supply of unskilled native resident workers. Since it is assumed
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that immigrants participate in production as unskilled workers in period zero,
the e¤ective labor supply of immigrant workers is represented as the third term
on the right-hand side of the equation. Further, we dene En 
R en
0
(1  e) dG+
q [1 G (e)] and rewrite equation (9) using this denition as
L0 = E

n + qM (10)
.
In the rst period, the total e¤ective labor supply becomes
L1 = (1 + g) (E

n + E

mM) (11)
where Em 
R em
0
(1  e  ') dG + q [1 G (em)] which represents the e¤ective
labor force supplied by o¤spring whose parents are immigrants.
After the rst period, o¤spring of immigrants are perfectly assimilated into
the host country. Thus the assimilation costs disappear after that. Thus, the
total e¤ective labor supplies after the second period become
Lt = (1 + g)
t
(1 +M)En (12)
.
2.4 Pension as the RDC system
Pension system is nanced as pay-as-you-go way under the RDC system. Re-
tirees receive pension benets proportional to the contribution they paid in the
working period. The rate of pension benets to contribution

z =
b(eix)
tW (e)

is
constant over periods The pension contribution is endogenously determined to
equalize total revenue with total pension benets. Admitting immigrants af-
fects native residents through the change in the contribution rate in the period
in which they arrive.
The superscript no is used to denote the value when no immigrants is ad-
mitted and the superscript im is used to denote the value when M immigrants
are admitted.
In the zero period, when the host country accept M unskilled immigrants,
the budget equilibrium in pension system becomes
z
1
(1 + g)
no 1E

nw = 
im
0 (E

n + qM)w (13)
. The left side of equation (13) represents the sum of the pension benets the
retires receive which equals the sum of the contributions the retires paid in
the working period multiplied by the constant rate of returns from the pension
contributions. The right side of equation (13) represents the sum of the pension
contributions the working generation must pay. Solving equation (13) with
respect to the pension contribution rate, im0 , we get 
im
0 =
zno 1
(1+g)
En
(En+qM)
.
When the host country does not any immigrants from abroad, the budget
equilibrium in pension system becomes
z
1
(1 + g)
no 1E

nw = 
no
0 E

nw (14)
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Solving equation (13) with respect to the pension contribution rate, no0 , we get
no0 =
zno 1
(1+g) . Regardless of whether accepting immigrants or not, the pension
benets in the period zero are the same. On the pension contribution rate,
we get im0 =
En
(En+qM)
no0 , thus 
im
0 < 
no
0 . The pension contribution rate
when immigrants are admitted becomes lower than that when no immigrants
is admitted. The burden of the working generation in the period zero becomes
lower when immigrants are admitted.
We dene the sum of the pension contribution paid by the t-th generation
native residents as Pt. When the di¤erence between when immigrants are ad-
mitted and when no immigrants is admitted is denoted with superscript ,Net,
we get PNet0 = P
no
0   P im0 , which can be calculated as
PNet0 = z
no 1
(1 + g)
Enw   z
no 1
(1 + g)
En
(En + qM)
w
PNet0 = z
no 1
(1 + g)
w

1  E

n
(En + qM)

> 0 (15)
. The value of equation (15) represents the net benets in the period zero when
immigrants are admitted.
Next, the pension contributions paid by the 1-th generation who are working
in the period zero and become retired in the 1-th period becomes lower, thus
the pension benets becomes also lower in the one period because the rate of
return from pension contribution is constant under the RDC system This is
a negative e¤ect from admitting immigrants. On the contrary, the pension
burden for the 2-nd generation also becomes lower while the o¤spring of the
immigrants are less e¤ective than the native o¤spring. These two e¤ects are
positive and negative. We can put together these e¤ects as follows. We dene
the sum of the pension benets the retires get as Bt. The di¤erence in Bt.
between

Bim1 = z

z
1+g

En
En+qM

no 1E

nw

when immigrants are admitted
and

Bno1 = z

z
1+g

no 1E

nw

when no immigrants is admitted becomes
BNet1 = z

z
1 + g

qM
En + qM

no 1E

nw (16)
. The value of equation (16) is the net decrease in the pension benets caused
by admitting immigrants. Thus this is the negative e¤ect. On the contrary,
the pension contribution receives the positive and the negative e¤ects from ad-
mitting immigrants. After some calculation, we get the net di¤erence in the
pension contribution as
PNet1 = z

z
1 + g

EmM
En + EmM

no 1E

nw (17)
which represents a net decrease in the pension contribution, which implies a
decrease in the burden of the native residents even if the productivities of the
o¤spring of immigrants caused by the assimilation costs are lower than the native
residents. Thus, the value of equation (17) is positive e¤ect from admitting
immigrants. Using equations (16) and (17), the net benets from admitting
immigrants in the period one becomes
6
NB1 = z

z
1 + g

EnM (E

m   q)
(En + qM) (En + EmM)

no 1E

nw > 0 (18)
.
After the period two, we can calculate the net benets from admitting im-
migrants. All e¤ects are put together in table 1.
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Table 1 shows that the total net benets for the native residents from admit-
ting immigrants become positive without any conditions even if the productivies
of o¤spring of the immigrants caused by assimilation costs become lower.
3 Discussion and Remaining Issues
We have analyzed the e¤ects of admitting immigrants under the RDC pension
system considering the assimilation costs like Jinno (2011, 2013). Jinno (2013)
shows that the net benets from admitting immigrants becomes higher under the
dened benets pension system than under the dened contributions pension
system when the number of immigrants is small. However, the net benets
can be negative under the both pension system, while this paper shows that it
always be positive under the RDC pension system without any conditions even
if the assimilation costs are considered. We should pay attention to this point.
In this paper, the net benets of admitting immigrants under the RDC
pension system always become positive. Thus we wonder if the net benets
could be used as funds to transform from the pay-as-you-go pension system
which is not di¢ cult to be sustainable to the funded pension system which
can be sustainable when the fertility rate is low. There is a remaining issue of
how many immigrants should be admitted to transfer from the pay-as-you-go
pension system to the funded pension system without a double burden for the
transition generation.
Admitting immigrants may raise the unemployment rate which may decrease
the welfare of the native residents This issue is also remain to be solved.
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